

[REDACTED]

20 March 1962

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MEMORANDUM FOR : Chief, Security Branch, Development Projects Division

SUBJECT : National Reconnaissance Office

REFERENCE : a. Memo for the Record from SD/DPD, Dated 16 March 1962;
Same Subject [REDACTED]

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b. Memo for DCI from DD/A, Dated 17 March 1962; Same
Subject (Draft)

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1. As was forecast in Reference a. [REDACTED] a draft of a proposed agreement for the management of the National Reconnaissance Program was written in Dr. Scoville's office, addressed to the DCI, dated 17 March 1962. This draft incorporated changes in the previous analogous document and was prepared with the view to having it signed by the DCI and the Deputy Secretary of Defense.

2. Paragraph 7 of Reference b. reads as follows:

"7. A uniform security control system will be established for the total program by the National Reconnaissance Office. Products from the various programs will be available to all users as designated by the United States Intelligence Board."

Since I felt that this language, although passive in the present draft, went to the heart of the [REDACTED] control system question, I asked Dr. Scoville for clarification following his meeting 19 March at noon with the DCI on the subject of reference b. Specifically, I inquired if it was the Director's view that within the language of paragraph 7, this Agency would be obliged to become the security control point for all sensitive programs within the purview of the National Reconnaissance Office. Dr. Scoville's reply was that the Director firmly felt that CIA should control the security systems of each and every program within the RFP domain. He added that he did not feel that this meant that we needed to consider ourselves primarily responsible for initiating and conducting all clearances in programs such as SAMOS, MIDAS, etc., but that these programs would be administered in accordance with the

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principles of the [redacted] and that CIA would be the central point of record for all clearances and would be responsible for inter-Agency coordination, clearance recordation, and dissemination of clearance information on all of them.

3. In view of the sweeping implications of this statement, I suggest that you actively discuss this with the Director of Security at the earliest possible moment. I suggest also that it would be inappropriate for us to initiate discussions with General Curtis or members of his staff on this subject until Messrs McCone and Gilpatric have agreed upon the specific language of the draft agreement. I told Mr. Scoville at the time of his reply that it was my view that a broadening of the scope of responsibility of the Office of Security under this paragraph was directly translatable into added manpower, although at this stage it was difficult to indicate what the order of the increase might be. I wanted to make sure that both he and the Director understood that in embracing this concept there was a dinner check to pay, since I added that I felt it was inappropriate to believe that the present OSD Security Staff, even augmented by the support now received from the Office of Security, could encompass a program involving many thousands of clearances. Please let me have your reaction to this once you have talked it over with Colonel Edwards [redacted]

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JAMES A. CUMMINGS, JR.
Acting Chief, OSD

CC: DD/R

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